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Introduction 
 
Mutual funds have played an increasingly important role in meeting the financial goals of U.S. 
investors over the last several decades. As shown in Table 1, the growth of equity mutual fund 
assets has been remarkable. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI)—the mutual 
fund trade association—total assets of equity mutual funds have increased from $40 billion at 
year-end 1980 to $2,503 billion at year-end 1998
1, representing a compound annual growth rate 
of 25.8% over the period. Overall, the mutual fund industry has benefited from a broader shift 
away from households investing directly in equities to indirect ownership of equities. This trend 
is documented in detail by Poterba and Samwick (1995). 
  
Table 1 Equity Mutual Fund Assets 
Year  Equity Mutual Fund Assets ($ billions) 
  Total  Held Outside Employer 
Plans, IRAs 
% Outside Employer Plans 
and IRAs 
1980  $ 40.0  $ 33.9  84.8% 
1985  $ 113.5  $ 77.3  68.1% 
1990  $ 228.3  $ 131.0  57.4% 
1995  $ 1,080.7  $ 575.0  53.2% 
1998  $ 2,503.3  $ 1,339.5  53.5% 
Source: ICI calculations 
 
The mutual fund industry benefited greatly from the introduction and growth of new retirement 
accumulation vehicles (e.g., 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement Accounts). However, a majority 
of mutual fund assets are still held outside tax-qualified vehicles. A lot of attention has recently 
been devoted to the tax efficiency of mutual fund investments. Dickson and Shoven (1994, 1995) 
argue that mutual funds have not generally considered the tax implication of their trading activity 
and suggest ways in which portfolio managers could improve after-tax returns for their   2 
shareholders. More recently, Bergstresser and Poterba (1999) consider how different portfolio 
characteristics affect after-tax returns and mutual fund cash flows. The topic of mutual fund tax 
efficiency has also received attention from legislators, as evidenced by the introduction of H.R. 
1089 (“The Mutual Fund Tax Awareness Act of 1999”), which would direct the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to improve disclosure of after-tax returns for mutual funds. 
 
While a lot of research has focused on the persistence of mutual fund performance (see, for 
example Carhart (1997)), there has been somewhat less discussion about the mutual fund 
structure as an investment vehicle. This paper considers how the tax situation of investors is 
affected by the mutual fund structure through the actions of other shareholders. We also discuss 
choices made by the mutual fund managers that can affect—positively or negatively—the after-
tax returns realized by their shareholders. The difference between the after-tax performance of 
mutual funds and directly held investments center mainly on how mutual fund cash flows can 
impact returns over time. 
 
Although mutual funds were established as pass-through vehicles, there are tax differences 
between funds and individually managed accounts. In particular, there are three significant 
differences that could impact the relative attractiveness of a mutual fund investment. First, 
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code—originally enacted in 1936 to provide for the tax 
treatment of pass-through entities, including mutual funds—does not include a provision to pass-
through the character of short-term capital gains for tax purposes.
2 Thus, while mutual funds 
report short-term capital gain distributions to their shareholders, these distributions are treated as 
ordinary income dividends and not as short-term capital gains.
3 This difference matters only if a   3 
taxpayer has realized losses that would not otherwise be offset by gains. In other words, the tax 
liability of a mutual fund shareholder could be greater if short-term losses were offset by long-
term gains that could otherwise have been offset by short-term gains from the mutual fund. 
Second, mutual funds can not distribute net realized losses. Instead, funds can use loss carry-
forwards for up to eight years following the year of the loss. The net effect of this treatment is to 
accelerate the tax liability of mutual fund shareholders versus individually managed accounts, 
where net losses can be declared in the year they occur and used to offset other gains or up to 
$3,000 of taxable income.
4 
 
These two negatives are offset by a significant benefit for mutual fund shareholders: the pass-
through of the fund’s expenses. Mutual funds distribute net investment income to shareholders, 
which is income received by the fund less charged expenses. Take for example, a mutual fund 
whose underlying portfolio of securities generates a 2 percent gross dividend yield. If the fund’s 
expense ratio—e.g., investment advisory, custody, distribution, shareholder servicing expenses—
is 1 percent, then the net income distribution to shareholders would be 1 percent. If the expense 
ratio were 0.5 percent, then the dividend would be 1.5 percent. Effectively, fund expenses are 
fully deductible for all taxpayers because they lower the taxable income received by 
shareholders. Generally, investment fees assessed in a non-registered investment vehicle (e.g., 
individually managed and trust accounts) are an itemized deduction that can be used only to the 
extent they exceed 2 percent of adjusted gross income.  
 
Mutual fund shareholders are taxed through two different mechanisms. Each year, a fund passes-
through its income and capital gains realizations in the form of distributions made to the fund’s   4 
shareholders. These distributions result from the actions of the portfolio manager and affect all 
shareholders in the fund because each shareholder receives their pro-rata share of the distribution 
(as of the distribution’s record date).  Although the portfolio manager’s trading activity leads to 
the fund’s distributions, the trading activity could have been initiated by the portfolio manager or 
imposed on the portfolio manager as a result of shareholder activity (net cash flow). It is this 
latter case that distinguishes the mutual fund or other commingled vehicles from “separate” 
accounts.
5 As such, a mutual fund investment is subject to a classic externality because the 
actions of other existing and potential investors can affect the taxable distributions to all 
shareholders. 
 
This paper explores the positive and negative externalities resulting from mutual fund cash flows 
and how these externalities can be affected by the management and accounting practices of the 
fund. Mutual fund redemptions are generally viewed as a negative relative to an individually 
managed account because redemptions can force capital gains to be realized and distributed to 
shareholders, accelerating their tax liability. Another argument is that negative cash flows can 
make otherwise tax-efficient funds unstable (Warther 1996). An implicit assumption in these 
arguments is that mutual funds use average cost accounting.
6 In fact, mutual funds have 
significant flexibility in choosing how they account for security sales, and we will show how the 
choice of accounting technique can either exacerbate or reduce the magnitude of the mutual fund 
tax externality. 
 
We also consider the other side of the cash flow argument; namely, that positive cash flows 
benefit mutual fund shareholders versus an investment vehicle with no ongoing cash flow (i.e., a   5 
separate account).
7 The positive externality associated with mutual fund cash flows has not been 
generally discussed and can represent a significant benefit to investors in mutual funds. Such 
cash flow dilutes the unrealized capital gains position of the fund and generally makes tax-
sensitive accounting techniques more powerful in reducing the overall tax burden of the 
investment. We will also show that these benefits can increase over time relative to a portfolio 
without cash flows. 
 
In addition to the tax imposed on mutual fund distributions, mutual fund shareholders also may 
face an additional tax liability upon the sale of such assets to the extent the market value upon 
sale is greater or less than their accumulated cost basis (which is the sum of the value of all 
purchases, including reinvested distributions). Obviously, these two forms of shareholder 
taxation are not mutually exclusive and represent a difference in the timing of tax payments. 
Postponing the realization of capital gains decreases the present value of the tax liability and 
allows individuals to take advantage of the lower long-run capital gains tax rates. Timing 
differences (i.e., the deferral or acceleration of tax liabilities) resulting from different mutual 
fund characteristics is an important focus of our analysis.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized around investigating the externalities associated with mutual 
fund investments. The next section briefly describes the positive and negative externalities 
associated with mutual fund management and how management practices can affect these 
relationships. The third section is the bulk of the paper and presents a simulation methodology 
that allows us to investigate the magnitude of the externalities. This section looks at how certain 
tax-management techniques can affect after-tax returns in both a separate account and a mutual   6 
fund environment. In addition, we consider the effects of accounting techniques and “closing” 
funds on the after-tax returns for shareholders. The final section presents a brief conclusion and 




Mutual Fund Tax Externality 
 
The differences between mutual funds and separately managed accounts and the effect of tax 
externalities can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that a mutual fund currently has 
three taxable shareholders whose initial purchases were completed at different times and were 
used to buy the same equity security (XYZ Company).
10 There are no other transactions in the 
fund. Table 2 gives the investment position of the fund and each of its shareholders: 
 
Table 2 Illustration of Tax-Externality 
 




Investor A purchases $100 
of fund shares 
 
Fund buys $100 of XYZ 
stock at $100/share 
 
1 share of XYZ stock; 
Market value = $100; 





Investor B purchases $125 
of fund shares 
 
Fund buys $125 of XYZ 
stock at $125/share 
 
2 shares of XYZ stock; 
Market value = $250; 





Investor C purchases $150 
of fund shares 
 
Fund buys $150 of XYZ 
stock at $150/share 
 
3 shares of XYZ stock; 
Market value = $450; 
Cost basis = $375 
   7 
 
Now assume that investor A redeems her entire investment in the next period, with XYZ stock 
trading at $140 per share. If another shareholder invests at the same time, then investor A can be 
paid with the cash received from the new shareholders without requiring any securities 
transactions at the fund level. However, if the redemption is the only shareholder transaction, 
then the fund must sell some of its holdings to raise the cash to pay the redeeming shareholder. 
However, the gain or loss realized (and then distributed to the remaining shareholders) would 
depend on the accounting treatment used. For example, selling the XYZ shares purchased with 
investor A’s initial investment—which would also correspond to FIFO accounting—would result 
in a $40 gain that must be distributed to the remaining shareholders.
11 However, the existence of 
other shareholders has presented a way to mitigate this potential externality. In particular, if the 
fund sells the shares purchased at $150 that resulted from investor C’s investment, then the fund 
would realize a $10 loss that would result in no current taxable capital gain distribution to the 
remaining shareholders and could be used to offset future capital gain realizations. It is important 
to stress that these differences affect the timing of the remaining shareholders’ tax liabilities as 
opposed to the elimination of any tax liability. When investors B and C ultimately sell their 
shares, they will owe taxes based on the capital gains realized upon redemption.
12 No matter 
which tax treatment is used by the fund, investor A still pays tax based on the difference between 
the market value of the redemption ($140) and her cost basis ($100).  
 
Construction of Mutual Funds 
More generally, consider a portfolio of (equity) securities. Its market value (MV) and cost basis 
(CB) can be represented by the following relationships:   8 
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where pij is the price of security i at time j, and Sit is the total number of shares of security i held 
at time t. Sit equals the sum of the holdings of the shares sij, which were initially purchased at 
time j.  (Note the relationships are a portfolio snapshot at time t. Net security positions, sij, may 
differ at times t and t+1 to the extent there are sales or purchases of the fund’s securities.) Also, 
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The net unrealized gain of the portfolio is a combination of positions at a loss and those at a gain 
(both across securities and within an individual security’s tax lots). It is important to recognize 
that the amount of gain or loss recognized from a partial sale of the portfolio’s assets can not be 
determined without further assumptions. Instead, the UGt relationship represents the net amount 
of gain or loss recognized if the portfolio were to be completely liquidated at time t. 
 
Equation (3) demonstrates that the dispersion in unrealized gain liabilities and, hence, in capital 
gain realizations is an important determinate in the ability to control the capital gain realizations   9 
through accounting procedures. In particular, the larger the standard deviation of (pit – pij) 
conditional on sij >0, the more ability the manager has to minimize or maximize tax realizations. 
In this context, a separate account with minimal cash flow will have very little ability to control 
gain realizations. On the other hand, a mutual fund with positive cash flow over time and that 
tends to buy small amounts of each security at different points in time will tend to have much 
more flexibility. 
 
The fund has four sources of cash flows.  First, the stocks held in the mutual fund pay dividends 
dt at time t.  Second, the fund pays expenses of xt to its fund managers.   Third, the fund is 
required to distribute annually the received dividends net of expenses and the realized capital 
gains to its shareholders, if they are positive. Realized capital losses are carried forward and 
subtracted from future realized capital gains.  The total fund distributions are denoted by fdt.  
The investors in the fund must pay taxes on those distributions.  Dividends and short-term capital 
gains (i.e., gains of assets held for one year or less) are taxed at the marginal income tax rate on 
ordinary income and long-term capital gains (i.e., gains of assets held for more than one year) are 
taxed at the lower capital gains tax rate.  Fourth, investors buy or redeem shares of the mutual 
fund.  Those exogenous cash flows are denoted by ct.  Additional flows result from the re-
investments of distributions by the fund’s shareholders. The proportion α of the dividend 
distributions and the proportion βof the capital gains distributions are automatically re-invested. 
Total cash flows must be absorbed by net asset sales. The total cash flows at time t are given by: 
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   10 
The rest of the paper investigates how portfolio management decisions, accounting procedures, 
and shareholder cash flow can affect the recognition of capital gains or losses in the fund. 
  
No Cash Flows 
A separate account of directly held securities may have little or no ongoing cash flows after the 
initial investment in the portfolio. Although dividends—to the extent they are reinvested—may 
provide some positive cash flow, the new positions resulting from reinvested dividends would 
likely be relatively small compared with the initial investments. These portfolios would not be 
subject to the tax externality described in the introduction because the account owners decide 
when to sell the assets, and the associated tax liability does not depend on the activity of any 
other shareholders (though discretionary portfolio management decisions could impact the 
account owners). 
 
There is a tradeoff for control over the portfolio’s tax liability, however. With no new cash 
flows, the portfolio’s net unrealized gain will increase if security prices rise over time. This has 
the potential to accelerate the tax liability for a shareholder in certain cases. For example, if 
positions are sold to maintain the portfolio’s security weightings over time (e.g., to maintain 
diversification of the portfolio’s assets), then gains may be realized instead of being able to direct 
cash flow to rebalance the portfolio. Also, if a forced realization of capital gains occurs (e.g., 
merger and acquisition activity among the portfolio’s holdings), the portfolio may have a higher 
ratio of market value to cost basis than a mutual fund that has had positive cash flows. 
    11 
Net Cash Flows 
A mutual fund or other commingled investment vehicle is subject to the cash flow patterns of 
both existing and new shareholders. Cash flows affect security transaction activity within the 
fund. As such, actions of other shareholders can cause positive or negative effects for all other 
shareholders. 
 
First, consider the case of positive cash flow. Assuming the fund is in a net unrealized gain 
position, the existence of positive cash flow dilutes the overall capital gain position of the fund 
because the market value and cost basis of any new investment are equal, whereas the portfolio’s 
market value exceeds its basis. An equivalent way of stating this relationship is that the new 
securities come in, in aggregate, at a cost higher than the average cost basis of the portfolio. This 
dilution is positive for the existing shareholders from a number of perspectives. First, it spreads 
any capital gain realizations across a larger shareholder base (i.e., the per-share value of any 
distribution is reduced). Second, it provides a means to offset negative cash flows that might 
otherwise require a liquidation of some equity positions. Finally, and most importantly, the 
addition of new cost lots at different prices through security purchases increases the power of the 
fund’s accounting techniques to mitigate any future redemption activity by allowing for greater 
choice among tax lots. Overall, cash flows can represent a positive externality. 
  
What about negative net cash flows? Unambiguously, if securities are sold at their average cost, 
then the portfolio will realize capital gains to the extent the portfolio’s basis is less than its 
market value. However, the portfolio does not have to realize gains or losses at their average 
costs. The decisions of the fund’s adviser—specifically, the accounting technique chosen—can   12 
mitigate the potential tax externality. That said, continuous redemptions can cause an accelerated 
tax liability over time even in a tax-efficient portfolio if share prices generally rise and the fund’s 
accounting techniques eliminate much of the gross unrealized loss in the portfolio. 
 
A number of studies have investigated the relationships affecting net cash flows (Barclay, 
Pearson, and Weisbach, 1998; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Bergstresser and Poterba, 1999). 
However, many of these relationships have been performance-based, which can often be fleeting. 
On the other hand, to the extent cash flows are positively correlated with equity market 
movements, it could imply that the tax-efficient accounting techniques described below are even 
more powerful because the portfolio would be buying when prices are rising and selling when 
prices are falling (and possibly realizing losses). 
 
The academic studies suggest that unrealized capital gains may be a factor in future net cash flow 
patterns and that managers might consciously control the “tax overhang” in order to remain 
attractive for future shareholders (Barclay, Pearson, and Weisbach, 1998). However, a tax 
efficient investor would probably prefer a buy-and-hold portfolio with a lower level of net cash 
flows than one in which that tax liability were accelerated in order to supposedly attract a high 
level of new cash. In other words, such a strategy significantly reduces the benefit of a positive 
cash flow. Another approach would be to advertise the fund, if this were successful in generating 
new cash flow over time. Most directly, the cash flow relationship can be affected by a decision 
to limit new cash to the fund—e.g., closing the fund to new investors. Closing a fund is often 
done for investment reasons in order to maintain the fund’s character and investment process. 
However, there is a potentially significant negative to such an approach: it makes negative cash   13 
flows and their associated externalities more likely. We investigate closing a fund in our 
simulations in the following section. 
 
Accounting Techniques 
Mutual funds are subject to the same rules as other owners of equity securities when accounting 
for security sales; namely, specific identification of the tax lots sold.
13 Currently, mutual funds 
are not required to disclose how they account for security sales in any prospectus or shareholder 
report. As demonstrated in the next section, this information could be useful to shareholders 
because different accounting techniques can have a material impact on the after-tax performance 
of mutual fund investments. 
 
It is also interesting to note that tax-efficient accounting techniques benefit all current fund 
investors. That is, accounting for security sales in different ways does not affect the fund’s pre-
tax return—the objective of a fund’s tax-deferred shareholders—but can improve the fund’s 
after-tax return—the objective of those shareholders holding the fund outside of a tax-qualified 
vehicle. Within this context, certain regulatory practices could affect the ability to use accounting 
techniques to affect the after-tax return for shareholders. In particular, a proposal in President 
Clinton’s fiscal year 1998 budget proposal would have required all security sales to use average 
cost accounting. Although this proposal was not included in the final budget for that year, the 
simulations in the next section suggest that such a move could accelerate the tax liability for 
shareholders in funds that currently use more tax-friendly accounting. 
   14 
Although a survey of accounting techniques among mutual funds is not available, we will 
consider a range of potential accounting techniques: first-in first-out (FIFO), last-in first-out 
(LIFO), average cost, and tax-sensitive accounting. Average cost identifies for sale the security 
position that is closest to the average cost of the overall position in the security, or equivalently 
sells a fixed fraction of all the lots purchased at different points in time. First-in, first-out is 
simply identifying for sale the oldest lot for each position. FIFO is usually a tax-inefficient 
strategy to the extent security prices rise over time. Last-in, first-out is selling the most recently 
purchased lot of each position. The last technique we consider is tax-sensitive accounting, which 
is often referred to as highest-in, first-out (HIFO) accounting. HIFO accounting identifies the 
highest cost lot in each security for sale.
14 These techniques and their ability to affect relative 
after-tax performance are investigated in the next section. 
 
The ability to use accounting techniques to affect after-tax performance depends on the 
management and structure of the investment vehicle. In particular, accounting techniques are 
more powerful when there is a greater dispersion of cost lots for each security. Accounting 
procedures can mitigate the potential negative effects of redeeming investors on the other 
shareholders. On the other hand, a separate account with a large initial investment relative to its 
overall portfolio does not have as much ability to leverage accounting techniques because the 
fund’s holdings would be much more concentrated at specific points in time (i.e., HIFO, LIFO, 
FIFO, and average cost are close to equivalent because there is minimal dispersion of cost lots). 
Similarly, active management techniques—where securities may be bought or sold in short time 
frames—may be less able to use accounting techniques than passively managed vehicles—where 
small slices of many securities tend to be transacted. However, for those portfolios with more   15 
concentrated buying and selling, the ability to effect trading strategies (e.g., harvesting losses) 
can have a relatively greater impact on after-tax returns. We investigate these inter-dependent 
relationships in the next section. 
 
 
Simulations of Mutual Funds 
 
In order to look at how tax-management policies can affect after-tax returns and the importance 
of externalities between shareholders, we constructed a simulator to isolate different factors that 
can affect after-tax returns, some of which (like the choice of accounting technique) are under 
the control of investment managers. These simulations attempt to quantify the magnitude of the 
effects discussed in the previous sections and how choices by mutual fund managers can mitigate 
or exacerbate the externalities between shareholders. 
 
We report results for simulated portfolios that invest in the fifty largest companies (in terms of 
market capitalization) in 1983 and track the returns of these portfolios over the next 15 years.
15 
We calculate returns using the actual monthly returns of the component stocks minus an expense 
charge of five basis points per month. We assume that ninety percent of the fund distributions of 
dividends and capital-gains are automatically reinvested in the mutual fund.
16 The after-tax 
returns are computed for an investor facing a 39.6 percent marginal income tax rate on dividends 
and realized short-term capital gain distributions and a 20.0 percent marginal tax rate on realized 
long-term capital gain distributions. These are the current rates for someone in the top federal   16 
income tax bracket.  We apply these rates to the entire 1984-98 period.
17   Further, we ignore 
state and local income taxes. A detailed description of the data set is contained in the Appendix. 
First, we evaluate four different accounting policies:  (1) always using the average cost basis for 
determining capital gains and losses, (2) using FIFO (using the cost basis of the oldest lots of a 
particular stock), (3) using LIFO (using the cost of the most recently acquired lots)
19, and (4) 
using HIFO (using the cost of the most expensive lots).   The cost basis of the remaining shares 
of a particular security also depends on the choice of accounting technique.  If HIFO is used, for 
instance, the cost basis of the remaining shares will be lower (i.e., the unrealized capital gain 
position of the fund will be greater) than if one of the other techniques is chosen.  By choosing 
accounting technique, the fund determines the timing of taxes of its shareholders.   
 
Second, we evaluate portfolios that follow active and  passive investment strategies. In our 
simulations, passively managed funds track either an equally- or a value-weighted index of the 
fifty companies in our dataset. Our actively managed funds are assumed to hold thirty of the fifty 
securities at all points in time.  The thirty stocks are held in value-weighted proportions.  Each 
month, the actively managed funds completely divest themselves of two of their thirty positions 
and bring in two randomly selected companies from the twenty that have been outside the fund.
20 
The portfolio is rebalanced so that the new holdings are proportional to the market capitalizations 
of the members.  The fact that the new entrants are randomly chosen probably reflects our bias 
towards the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
We examine three alternative rules for choosing which two securities to kick out of the mutual 
fund each month.  One rule is to drop the two firms that have the largest gains relative to their   17 
cost bases. A second rule is exactly the opposite – to sell the two firms that have the lowest price 
relative to cost basis.  This is a relatively tax efficient strategy, although it is not the tax 
minimizing strategy which would keep track of the difference between short and long-term gains 
and losses and which would make the number of stocks liquidated dependent on the cost basis. 
The third rule chooses the two stocks to be deleted each month randomly.  Under this regime, the 
actively managed funds are true noise traders, exchanging randomly chosen positions for equally 
randomly chosen replacements. 
 
It is important to note that the three different security selection processes of our active fund 
simulations will result in different portfolios and, hence, different pre-tax returns. A portfolio 
that sells two stocks with the greatest appreciation will obviously sell different stocks in a given 
month than an otherwise similar portfolio that sells the two stocks with the least amount of 
appreciation. Hence, the constituents and portfolio weights of the portfolios will differ over time, 
This is different from our index-fund simulations, where the differences among the portfolios—
accounting technique and cash-flow patterns—do not affect pre-tax returns among the simulated 
portfolios.  
 
Third, we also consider  the impact of net mutual fund sales on the after tax returns that the fund 
offers its long-term shareholders. The first net sales regime applies to a fund that has a trend of 
net sales equal to one percent of assets per month.  The second regime, roughly corresponding to 
a fund that is closed to new purchases (or at least to some classes of potential buyers), is for a 
fund with a trend rate of net sales of minus one percent of assets per month.  That is, on average 





The results in Table 3 detail the simulation of an equally-weighted index fund that holds all fifty 
stocks. That is, two percent of the fund’s assets are invested in each of the fifty securities.  The 
maintenance of the two-percent weights implies a monthly rebalancing of the portfolio—selling 
stocks whose relative price has risen and buying additional shares in those whose relative price 
has fallen.  Table 3 displays the before and after-tax average monthly returns for the entire period 
1984-98 for an equally-weighted index fund experiencing deterministic net sales. It is important 
to note that the after-tax returns in Table 3 represent buy-and-hold returns that tend to overstate 
the actual differences for investors that will ultimately sell their holdings because of the timing 
differences of gains realizations among the different simulations considered. We show results for 
investors who liquidate their investment at the end of the horizon later in the discussion.   19 
Table 3  Average Monthly Returns for Passively Managed Funds with Equal 
Weights and Deterministic Sales, 1984-98 
 
A.  Average Before-Tax Monthly Returns 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  LIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 
0  1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 
+1%  1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 
 
B.  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  LIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.2347 1.2220 1.2630 1.2821 
0  1.2894 1.2731 1.3183 1.3503 
+1%  1.3296 1.3137 1.3475 1.3830 
 
 
Panel A simply reminds us that the before-tax return is exactly the same for the different 
accounting techniques and different patterns of net sales of the fund because portfolio 
constituents and their weights are unaffected by the choice of accounting technique or cash flow.  
This means that an investor holding the fund in a tax-qualified pension account (such as an IRA 
or 401(k) account) would be indifferent to the arguments of this sub-section.   
 
On the other hand, Panel B confirms our intuition and previous discussion. Namely, that 
accounting techniques and net cash flow can have important affects on after-tax returns. In other 
words, a taxable investor who was in one of these funds for the entire period 1984-98 would care 
a lot about which cell in the panel his fund has chosen for him.  Our separate account simulation 
where there is no ongoing cash flow  (other than dividends received and the assumed ten percent 
of dividend and capital gains distributions that are not reinvested) shows a difference of 7.72 
basis points per month in after-tax returns between a fund that uses HIFO accounting and one 
that uses FIFO. Perhaps more realistically, the difference between HIFO and average cost   20 
accounting is 6.09 basis points per month or 73 basis points per year. Over long holding periods, 
such as ten or fifteen years,  an annual 73 basis points differential can be very significant. 
 
The externality effects of cash flows are demonstrated in the relative returns of a growing fund 
versus a shrinking fund. The individual buy-and-hold investor in the fund with 1 percent net 
sales per month experiences a much higher after-tax return—10.09 basis points per month when 
the funds use HIFO accounting—than the investor in the shrinking fund.  This is a difference of 
slightly more than 121 basis points per year—an enormous amount considering that the two 
funds hold exactly the same securities with the same weights and use the same accounting 
techniques. This difference is due to the externality between existing shareholders and new 
shareholders that we discussed in the previous section of the paper.  The fund with a steady 
supply of new shareholders is continuously buying new lots of the fifty securities and can 
accomplish the monthly rebalancing (to retain the two-percent weights) with far less tax 
consequence than the fund experiencing steady net redemptions.  The interaction between these 
effects shows even greater dispersions in after-tax returns. For example, the difference between 
owning a tax-sensitive HIFO index fund experiencing net new sales every month and an average-
cost basis index fund experiencing net redemptions is 14.83 basis points per month or more than 
1.78 percent per year. 
 
Table 4 looks at whether the magnitude of these externalities may change as the portfolios age. 
Our simulated passively managed funds begin in 1984 with newly acquired positions in all fifty 
stocks.  Initially, there is not much advantage to one accounting technique over the other because 
all of the original lots carry the same cost basis.  The advantage of HIFO and LIFO over FIFO   21 
and average cost accounting grows as the number of lots of purchases to choose amongst for 
partial liquidations grows.  To examine this effect, we calculate the difference accounting 
choices and net sales makes for the years 1994-98 for our funds begun in 1984.  The average 
monthly before-tax return for the sample of fifty equally weighted stocks was 1.7981 percent for 
the 1994-98 period.  This is certainly a much better than average period of time for large 
capitalization stocks such as those in our sample.  The average after-tax returns for 1994-98 are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns for Passively Managed Funds with 
Equal Weights and Deterministic Sales, 1994-98 
 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.5158 1.4949 1.5641 
0  1.5846 1.5564 1.6583 
+1%  1.6335 1.6052 1.6958 
 
 
The gain from the relatively tax efficient HIFO policy is larger than before.  For example, with 
zero exogenous net sales, the difference between HIFO and FIFO is 10.19 basis points per month 
and the difference between HIFO and average cost accounting is 7.37 basis points per month.  
The difference between the after-tax performance of growing and shrinking funds is also wider 
for the five years 1994-98 than it is for the entire time period 1984-98.  Now, comparing the 
HIFO results for  one percent net sales with the HIFO results with minus one percent net sales, 
the growing fund offers its high-tax shareholders a 13.17 basis points a month advantage.  This is 
more than thirty percent greater than the difference over the entire fifteen-year period, a 
difference that we already thought was enormous.  For the five years 1994-98, the difference in 
after-tax return for a HIFO index fund experiencing one percent per month net sales and an   22 
average cost index fund experiencing one percent net redemptions is 18.00 basis points per 
month or 2.16 percent per year. 
 
These results—and the results of the other simulations reported below—must be tempered 
somewhat by the fact that equity returns were very strong over the period of our simulations. In a 
generally rising equity market, accounting differences have the potential to add more value on an 
after-tax basis because HIFO accounting would tend to realize a small gain or loss on a relatively 
recent security purchase (to the extent cash flow allowed for security purchases). FIFO 
accounting, on the other hand, would realize old securities at a much larger gain (on average). In 
a declining equity market, accounting and net cash flow differences would likely have a 
somewhat smaller effect because there would be more losses to realize throughout the portfolio, 
resulting in a generally lower tax liability. 
 
Value-Weighted Fund 
The assumption that the passive funds hold their positions with equal weights causes them to 
realize gains and losses in the process of monthly rebalancing.  If the fund held positions with 
value or market capitalization weights, rebalancing would be greatly reduced. With value 
weights, rebalancing is necessary only if the companies in the index issue or repurchase shares or 
if the composition of the largest fifty companies changes due to mergers and acquisitions.  
Besides, it could be argued that market capitalization weights are more consistent with the 
indexing philosophy. We have examined the effect of the same accounting and net sales 
assumptions for the case with value weights.  The results are shown in Table 5.  For the record,   23 
the average monthly before-tax return on value-weighted portfolios is 1.4972 percent for 1984-
98 and 2.0275 percent for 1994-98.   
 
Table 5  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns for Passively Managed Funds with 
Market Capitalization Weights and Deterministic Sales 
A. 1984-1998 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.3122 1.3070 1.3190 
0  1.3895 1.3863 1.4015 
+1%  1.4044 1.4017 1.4091 
 
B. 1994-1998 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.8390 1.8313 1.8424 
0  1.9487 1.9432 1.9655 
+1%  1.9666 1.9618 1.9729 
 
The results confirm our intuition: the accounting technique is much less important with value 
weights because much less rebalancing is necessary.
21  The choice of accounting technique is 
most important when a portion of a position is being sold.  Here that happens to a much smaller 
extent than with equal weights because value weights automatically adjust to market movements. 
Hence, portfolio sales are largely dictated by changes to the index being tracked (which are 
minimal in our data set) and negative cash flow. This explains the convergence of the results in 
Table 5 when cash flow is non-negative. In these cases, there is very little selling of the index’s 
underlying securities; hence, their after-tax returns are nearly identical. However, it is important 
to note that the externality imposed by the presence or absence of new investors is still present 
and is essentially undiminished.  The difference between HIFO accounting with 1 percent new 
sales and 1 percent new redemptions is 9.01 basis points per month over the entire 1984-98 
period and is 13.05 percent per month for the 1994-98 period.  
   24 
Liquidation Tax 
The calculations in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are for funds operating on an ongoing basis.  Individual 
investors who joined the fund at inception could have experienced the returns shown in these 
tables.  If they do not sell their mutual fund holdings until they pass through an estate, the gains 
from tax deferral could translate into permanent gains. The estate or heir could sell the mutual 
fund shares at net asset value and owe no taxes on the difference between NAV and the cost 
basis of the mutual fund shares (or the cost basis of the underlying shares in the fund for that 
matter).  However, it is true that the funds using HIFO accounting are carrying their portfolio 
positions at significantly lower cost bases than funds using average cost accounting or FIFO. 
 
By looking at cases where the investment is liquidated at the end of the time period, we can get a 
better sense of the value of the timing differences.  Table 6 shows after-tax return figures for 
investors in the funds from the beginning in 1984 whose investment was liquidated at  the end of 
1998. The average before-tax return is still 1.5000 percent per month, just as it was in Table 3.   
 
Table 6  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns (1984-98) for Passively Managed 
Funds with Equal Weights, Deterministic Sales, and Liquidation in 1998 
 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
-1%  1.1884 1.1883 1.2012 
0  1.2478 1.2416 1.2815 
+1%  1.2922 1.2842 1.3283 
  
Although the magnitude of the differences are somewhat reduced relative to the results reported 
in Table 3, the advantage of tax-efficient accounting (i.e., HIFO) instead of average cost 
accounting remain substantial.  For instance, with zero exogenous net sales, the difference 
between HIFO and average cost accounting is 3.37 basis points per month over the fifteen year   25 
period.  Even ignoring compounding, that means that after fifteen years the HIFO fund will leave 
its holders with more than six percent more after-tax wealth than the average cost accounting 
fund.  More strikingly, the externality between early shareholders and new shareholders is still 
present in undiminished form.  Even if a fund is going to be liquidated at the end of fifteen years, 
taxable holders are far better off being in a fund that grows until the end rather than one that 
steadily loses shareholders. Of course, the value of tax deferral increases with time, and the 
fifteen-year horizon analyzed in these simulations is probably much longer than the typical 
investor’s holding period. Thus, the cash flow and accounting differences discussed here would 
be much less important to an investor who plans to buy and sell their investments relatively 
frequently.  
 
Randomness of Fund Sales 
Funds don’t experience the steady exogenous supply of new buyers that we have been 
examining.  The next question we look at is the cost of random ebbs and flows that funds 
actually experience.  To do this, we examine the after-tax average returns of both equally 
weighted and market capitalization-weighted index funds experiencing fluctuating net sales.  We 
superimpose a standard deviation of 4.5 percent per month on the underlying trend of net sales 
and a serial autocorrelation of 0.25.  These values correspond with the data on observed monthly 
net sales for a sample of roughly 800 equity mutual funds over the period 1992-99. This 
simulation is repeated 100 times and the following tables report the average after-tax returns. 
The results for both fluctuating net sales and deterministic net sales are shown in Table 7.  
   26 
As we saw before, the value-weighted index fund needs to do very little rebalancing in our 
simulations, so the gains from tax-efficient accounting techniques are minimal with deterministic 
cash flows.  However, Panel B indicates that fluctuating cash flows make the choice of 
accounting technique very important.  The reason is that “ebbs” force the funds to sell off some 
of their positions and this is just the circumstance where accounting techniques matter. When an 
index fund sells positions, it sells small slices of each of its holdings. Because our simulated 
funds would then engage in 50 partial redemptions, the choice of accounting technique makes a 
significant difference in the amount of taxable gains realized. 
 
 
Table 7  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns (1984-98) for Passively Managed 
Funds;  Deterministic vs. Fluctuating Net Sales 
A.  Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
+1% Deterministic  1.3296  1.3137  1.3830 
+1%, 4.5% SD  1.3075  1.2918  1.3688 
Difference .0221  .0219  .0142 
 
B. Market Capitalization Weighted Portfolios 
Net Sales/Assets  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
+1% Deterministic  1.4044  1.4017  1.4091 
+1%, 4.5% SD  1.3499  1.3272  1.3997 
Difference .0545  .0745  .0094 
 
Panel B indicates that mere fluctuations in net redemptions alone reduce the average monthly 
after-tax rate of return by 5.45 basis points a month if the value-weighted fund uses average cost 
accounting.  On the other hand, HIFO accounting reduces the impact of net sales fluctuations by 
more than eighty percent.  The HIFO fund with fluctuating net sales has an average after-tax 
return that is less than one-half basis point per month below the average cost accounting firm 
without fluctuating sales.  Perhaps more importantly, the HIFO fund has a five basis points a   27 
month advantage over the average cost fund in an environment of fluctuating net sales.  These 
same patterns are apparent for the equally weighted index funds of Panel A, although the 
magnitudes differ. 
 
The basic lesson that we take from Table 7 is that the externality of fluctuating sales on existing 
shareholders can be significantly and in some cases greatly reduced by mutual fund managers if 
they adopt the appropriate accounting policies.  Under HIFO the ebbs and flows of other 
shareholders has only a very slight impact on the buy and hold fund participants.  The same 




We now turn to our stylized versions of actively managed funds.
22  Table 8 shows after-tax 
returns for the three different strategies of choosing which two of the 30 stocks to eliminate from 
the portfolio each month.  Panel A is for a fund experiencing a trend rate of net sales of  1 
percent (with a standard deviation of 4.5 percent per month and a coefficient of serial correlation 
of 0.25). Panel B is for a fund with no net sales (e.g., an individually managed account). Panel C 
shows the same asset strategies for funds that are experiencing trend net redemptions of one 
percent per month.  
   28 
 
 
Table 8  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns (1984-98) for Actively Managed 
Funds with Market Capitalization Weights 
A. One Percent Trend Growth 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.1391  1.1540  1.1585 
Random Sells  1.2480  1.2446  1.2621 
Sell Losers  1.3470  1.3343  1.4268 
 
B. Separate Account (zero percent growth) 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.1248  1.1272  1.1302 
Random Sells  1.2269  1.2246  1.2380 
Sell Losers  1.3458  1.3196  1.4353 
 
C. Negative One Percent Trend Growth 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.0961  1.1000  1.1103 
Random Sells  1.1837  1.1824  1.1923 
Sell Losers  1.2486  1.2317  1.3282 
 
 
The choice of accounting technique continues to play a significant role, with the difference 
between HIFO and average cost accounting varying between two and eight basis points per 
month.  The difference in investment policy is even larger.  For instance, in Panel A, the 
difference in average after tax return of discarding losers and discarding winners is almost 27 
basis points per month.
23  This is despite the fact that the before-tax return is slightly (three basis 
points) higher for the discarding winners strategy than the discarding losers one.
24  The overall 
difference between choosing a growing fund which is discarding losers and using HIFO and an 
alternative actively managed fund that sells winners, uses average cost accounting and is 
experiencing trend net redemptions is 33.07 basis points per month or 4.0 percent per year.  This 
is an enormous difference for two funds experiencing the same market returns and choosing from   29 
the same universe (large cap stocks) of securities.  Almost all of the advantage of one fund over 
the other is due in some way to the management of the fund. 
 
It is interesting that the mutual fund that uses HIFO and a policy of discarding losers in Panel A. 
of Table 8 has a higher after-tax return than the HIFO value-weighted index fund in Panel B of 
Table 7.  To make the cases comparable, one wants to look at the case of fluctuating net sales.  
This certainly indicates that a tax-sensitive actively managed fund can outperform a tax-sensitive 
index fund, although a number of our assumptions affect this result.  There are no bid-ask 
spreads in our model and we charge the same expenses to both index and actively managed 
funds.  On the other hand, we have a particularly rigid actively managed strategy.  A real-world 
tax-sensitive actively managed fund would not mechanically replace two positions each month.  
They would opportunistically replace positions with large losses as they occur.  
 
Liquidation Tax 
For completeness, we also examine the cases where actively managed funds are liquidated at the 
end of our fifteen-year period in order to quantify the timing element of capital gains deferral and 
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Table 9  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns (1984-98) for Actively Managed 
Funds with Market Capitalization Weights; Liquidated in 1998 
 
A. One Percent Trend Growth 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.1260  1.1403  1.1433 
Random Sells  1.2162  1.2141  1.2275 
Sell Losers  1.2968  1.2920  1.3595 
 
B. Negative One Percent Trend Growth 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.0838  1.0881  1.0960 
Random Sells  1.1380  1.1382  1.1436 
Sell Losers  1.2015  1.2054  1.2402 
  
 
While the advantage of the investment strategy of selling the biggest losing positions in the fund 
each month is reduced by between three and eight basis points a month, it still is the strategy 
with the highest after-tax monthly return.  In fact, the differences across investment strategy are 
still extremely large and the differences across accounting policies are significant.  The fund with 
the best combination of policies (HIFO, selling losers, and a positive trend of net sales) beats the 
fund with the worst combination (average cost accounting, selling winners, and a negative trend 
of net sales) by an after-tax margin of 27.57 basis points per month.  Considering that all of these 
funds are choosing from the same fifty stocks over the same time frame and they all are being 
liquidated at the end of the period, this difference in monthly after-tax returns has to be 
considered enormous. 
 
Closing the Fund 
The next issue we examine is the impact on long-term holders of closing an actively managed 
fund to new investors or to certain classes of new investors.  Mutual funds, particularly large   31 
mutual funds such as Vanguard Windsor and Fidelity Magellan, have taken this action.  The 
stated reason is usually that the managers of the fund cannot find productive investments in 
which to place additional funds.  The fund may also be concerned about establishing such large 
positions as to lose liquidity.
25  The question that we are concerned with is the externality effect 
on the long-term holders. 
 
Are the long-term holders harmed by the absence of new buyers of the fund?  We assess this 
issue by reexamining the performance of our actively managed simulated funds.  We compare 
the funds in two different scenarios.  In the first scenario, the fund is left open to new buyers for 
the entire fifteen years of our model.  The net sales are random with a positive trend of one-
percent of assets per month and the same 4.5 percent per month standard deviation previously 
assumed.  Under the second scenario, the fund is open for the first ten years with the same sales 
experience, but it is then closed over 1994-98.  The closed fund has negative net sales.  These are 
generated from a trend of negative one-percent of assets per month and a standard deviation of 
4.5 percent a month.  The resulting net sales distributions are truncated so that net sales are 
always nonpositive when the fund is closed to new investors.
26  The average redemptions are 
approximately two percent per month under these assumptions.    
 
Table 10 demonstrates that closing the fund to new investors likely has a large negative impact 
on the taxable holders of the fund.  In all cases, the impact is significant, but it is the largest for 
funds that otherwise were following tax efficient practices.  The funds that systematically divest 
themselves of their largest losers cost their taxable shareholders between 18 and 25 basis points 
per month in after-tax return by closing the fund.  The relatively tax-efficient investment policy   32 
of selling losers still offers the highest after-tax rates of return, but its effectiveness is greatly 
diminished by the closure of the fund to new investors.  The most tax efficient strategy of all 
remains the combination HIFO and selling losers.  The fact that its after-tax return in Table 3.14 
is slightly below that of the FIFO fund with the same investment policy is a result that the before 
tax returns are not identical across the cells of these tables.  While it is still true that HIFO is the 





Table 10  Average After-Tax Monthly Returns (1994-98) for Actively Managed 
Funds with Market Cap Weights;  
 
A. One Percent Trend Growth; Open to New Investors 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.6875  1.6664  1.6706 
Random Sells  1.7384  1.7334  1.7547 
Sell Losers  1.8901  1.9146  1.9635 
 
 
B. Minus One Percent Trend Growth; Closed to New Investors 
Investment Policy  Average Cost  FIFO  HIFO 
Sell Winners  1.6050  1.5687  1.5542 
Random Sells  1.6017  1.5998  1.6049 





Our overall conclusion is that the tax-induced externalities between mutual fund shareholders are 
extremely large and important and that they can be influenced by management policies.  The 
costs of random fluctuations in net sales on the after-tax performance of the fund are greatly   33 
diminished by choosing HIFO, for instance.  The advantage of a fund with positive net sales 
relative to one with net redemptions is also extremely large.  Net sales are presumably somewhat 
under the control of management.  The extreme action of management closing the fund to new 
buyers is found to have a devastating impact on the ability to pursue tax efficient strategies.  
Finally, the active investment policy of selling losing positions relative to selling off winners 
offers much better after tax returns. 
 
We find that there is nothing inherently inconsistent with tax-efficient actively managed 
portfolios. Active management techniques (e.g. selling losers vs. selling winners) appear to have 
a greater impact on after-tax returns than the choice of accounting technique.  Both are very 
important, however.  In other words, large-capitalization index funds can generally generate 
good tax efficiency by simply choosing a tax-efficient accounting technique, whereas the tax 
efficiency of actively managed funds requires both a tax-motivated investment strategy (such as 
selling losing positions) and the appropriate tax-efficient accounting policy.  With an aggressive 
combination of tax-efficient policies, the actively managed funds we simulated could have 
provided greater tax efficiency than similarly constructed indexed funds that only use tax-
sensitive accounting. 
 
Given the sensitivity of after-tax returns to the accounting policies implemented by mutual fund 
managers, it appears that fund investors could benefit from better information about how their 
funds account for security sales.  Today, no disclosure is required to detail how security positions 
are accounted for upon sale. Certainly our simulations indicate that this information would be of   34 
value to taxable mutual fund investors and can impact after-tax returns by as much as eight basis 
points per month among otherwise identical funds based on our simulations. 
 
One significant area for future research would include a practical look at policies that mutual 
funds can implement to reduce the externalities identified in this paper. Many tax-managed funds 
currently assess asset-based redemption fees that are paid to the fund to compensate shareholders 
for the actions of short-term investors whose redemptions could force capital gain realizations on 
other shareholders. Although redemption fees may be a good way to internalize the externality, 
the optimal structure of these fees would be an interesting extension. Another approach to these 
issues might be the use of cash reserves as an “insurance policy” against having to sell stocks 
and realize gains when faced with negative cash flow. Of course, there is a potential trade-off in 
holding cash in generally rising equity markets (i.e., lowers the pre-tax return), and borrowing 
cash (i.e., leverage) faces many regulatory hurdles within the mutual fund context. 
 
We find that the tax externalities facing mutual fund investors are important considerations in 
choosing between mutual funds and direct investments. We have demonstrated that the existence 
of positive net cash flow can provide a significant benefit to existing mutual fund shareholders, 
and that any negative externalities resulting from mutual fund redemptions can be mitigated by 
the management practices of the fund. Although separate accounts arguably provide greater 
direct control over an individual’s own tax situation, we have shown that a tax-sensitive mutual 
fund can meet or exceed the after-tax returns of an individually managed account. Further 
research into the mutual fund versus separate account debate may be useful because it seems that   35 
this subject has not received the attention that it deserves in both the academic and popular 
literature on portfolio choice.     36 
Appendix: Data 
Our source of the return and distribution data of the stocks used in the mutual fund simulations is 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  CRSP maintains a comprehensive collection 
of standard and derived security data available for the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq Stock Market.  
The mutual fund simulations use the returns, the distributions, and the market capitalizations of 
the fifty largest companies in December 1983 in terms of market capitalization.  We used the 
CRSP data set to identify those fifty companies.  The returns and dividends were derived using 
CRSP's holding period returns with and without dividends over the period from January 1984 to 
December 1998.   
 
Table A lists some summary statistics of the companies in our dataset.  Seven of the 50 
companies were delisted from the three stock exchanges.  If a company was merged into another 
company, we followed the stock of the acquirer after the merger.  If a company was bought out 
for cash, we replaced it with the largest market capitalization company that is not already in the 
dataset after taking into account taxable cash-distributions.  Standard Oil of Ohio merged with 
BP in June 1987 after paying a small cash-distribution to its shareholders.  Shell, Marubeni, 
Getty Oil, Gulf Oil, Reynolds R J Industries, Texas Oil an Gas, and Superior Oil were all bought 
out for cash and were replaced by TDK Corp., Westinghouse Electric, Halliburton, Smithkline 
Beckman, Xerox, Intel, and American International Group, respectively. Superior Oil never 
enters our dataset because it was already bought out in October 1984. The monthly return of an 
equally-weighted index of the 50 companies had a mean of 1.50 percent and a standard deviation 
of 4.12 percent.  The corresponding summary statistics for a value-weighted index were 1.50   37 
percent and 4.11 percent.  The means and standard deviations of the two indices correspond 
closely to the performance of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index.  Of the 43 companies that were 
in our dataset for 15 years, Pfizer had the highest monthly return of 2.37 percent and Tenneco 
had the lowest return of 0.63 percent.  Motorola's returns had the highest monthly standard 
deviation of 9.75 percent, whereas Exxon's returns had a standard deviation of only 4.42 percent.  
 
 
Table 11: Companies in Dataset 
 
Rank  Company Name (in Dec. 1983)  Ticker  In Dataset  Mkt.Cap.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       in Mio.  Return  per Month 
       28-Dec-83  per  Month   
1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS COR  IBM  Jan-84-Dec-98  74,508  1.16%  7.67% 
2 AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEG CO  T  Jan-84-Dec-98  59,392  1.60%  6.90% 
3  EXXON  CORP  XON  Jan-84-Dec-98  31,623 1.65% 4.42% 
4 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO  GE  Jan-84-Dec-98  26,653  1.90%  6.15% 
5 GENERAL MOTORS CORP  GM  Jan-84-Dec-98  23,419  1.11%  7.58% 
6 STANDARD OIL CO IND  SN  Jan-84-Dec-98  14,829  1.35%  4.91% 
7  SCHLUMBERGER  LTD  SLB Jan-84-Dec-98  14,481 0.85% 7.79% 
8  CANON  INC  CANNY  Jan-84-Dec-98  13,746 1.16% 7.94% 
9 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO  S  Jan-84-Dec-98  13,163  1.26%  7.93% 
10 EASTMAN KODAK CO  EK  Jan-84-Dec-98  12,614  1.07%  6.45% 
11 DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS & CO  DD  Jan-84-Dec-98  12,421  1.54%  6.61% 
12 SHELL OIL CO  SUO  Jan-84-May-85  12,365  2.99%  9.28% 
13 ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO   RD  Jan-84-Dec-98  12,062  1.77%  5.64% 
14 STANDARD OIL CO CALIFONIA  CHV  Jan-84-Dec-98  11,846  1.43%  5.83% 
15  MOBIL  CORP  MOB  Jan-84-Dec-98  11,696 1.57% 5.50% 
16 HEWLETT PACKARD CO  HWP  Jan-84-Dec-98  10,802  1.56%  9.45%   38 
17 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO  ARC  Jan-84-Dec-98  10,802  1.24%  6.42% 
18 MINNESOTA MINING & MFG CO  MMM  Jan-84-Dec-98  9,672  1.15%  5.62% 
19 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO  PG  Jan-84-Dec-98  9,469  1.84%  6.14% 
20 MARUBENI CORP  MARTY  Jan-84-Apr-84  9,422  9.97%  17.35% 
21  TEXACO  INC  TX  Jan-84-Dec-98  9,292 1.30% 5.95% 
22 SHELL TRANSPORT & TRADING  SC  Jan-84-Dec-98  9,046  1.70%  6.30% 
23 PHILIP MORRIS INC  MO  Jan-84-Dec-98  8,968  2.22%  7.31% 
24 G T E CORP  GTE  Jan-84-Dec-98  8,341  1.43%  5.16% 
25 JOHNSON & JOHNSON  JNJ  Jan-84-Dec-98  7,821  1.96%  6.67% 
26 GETTY OIL CO  GET  Jan-84-Jan-84  7,765  24.59%   
27 AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CO  AHP  Jan-84-Dec-98  7,735  1.73%  5.92% 
28 COCA COLA CO  KO  Jan-84-Dec-98  7,295  2.29%  6.22% 
29 GULF OIL CORP  GO  Jan-84-May-84  7,130  14.12%  13.21% 
30 FORD MOTOR CO  F  Jan-84-Dec-98  7,127  2.11%  7.82% 
31 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO  AXP  Jan-84-Dec-98  6,961  1.69%  8.27% 
32 REYNOLDS R J INDUSTRIES INC  RJR  Jan-84-Apr-89  6,881  3.16%  10.04% 
33 MERCK & CO INC  MRK  Jan-84-Dec-98  6,683  2.31%  6.61% 
34 DOW CHEMICAL CO  DOW  Jan-84-Dec-98  6,536  1.38%  6.97% 
35 HONDA MOTOR LTD  HMC  Jan-84-Dec-98  6,287  1.48%  8.50% 
36 I TT CORP  ITT  Jan-84-Dec-98  6,160  1.33%  6.64% 
37 UNION PACIFIC CORP  UNP  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,824  1.01%  6.68% 
38 BELL CANADA ENTERPRISES  BCE  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,806  1.19%  5.25% 
39 BRISTOL MYERS CO  BMY  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,760  1.87%  5.66% 
40  TENNECO  INC  TEN Jan-84-Dec-98  5,714 0.63% 6.85% 
41  PFIZER  INC  PFE Jan-84-Dec-98  5,705 2.37% 7.56% 
42  UNOCAL  CORP  UCL Jan-84-Dec-98  5,493 1.12% 8.00% 
43  ABBOTT  LABS  ABT Jan-84-Dec-98  5,480 1.97% 6.21% 
44 WAL MART STORES INC  WMT  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,439  2.30%  7.63% 
45 STANDARD OIL CO OF OH  SOH  Jan-84-May-87  5,396  1.93%  6.84% 
46  MOTOROLA  INC  MOT  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,366 1.51% 9.75% 
47 PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO  P  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,286  1.08%  7.75%   39 
48 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP  ROK  Jan-84-Dec-98  5,098  1.18%  7.11% 
49  SUN  INC  SUN Jan-84-Dec-98  5,081 0.91% 7.22% 
50 TEXAS OIL & GAS CORP  TXO  Jan-84-Jan-86  5,010  -1.75%  7.83% 
51 T D K CORP  TDK  Feb-84-Dec-98  4,955  1.17%  9.25% 
52 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP  WX  May-84-Dec-98  4,792  1.23%  8.72% 
53  HALLIBURTON  COMPANY  HAL Jun-84-Dec-98  4,778 1.00% 9.47% 
54 SMITHKLINE BECKMAN CORP  SKB  Jun-85-Jun-89  4,706  1.69%  8.20% 
55  XEROX  CORP  XRX  Jun-86-Dec-98  4,698 1.82% 8.09% 
56 INTEL CORP  INTC  May-89-Dec-98  4,691  3.62%  10.68% 
57 SUPERIOR OIL CO  SOC     4,676      
58 AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC  AIGR  Jul-89-Dec-98  4,665  2.02%  6.40% 
 BRITISH PETROLEUM PLC  BP  Jun-87-Dec-98  637  1.32%  6.42% 
          
 Equally-Weighted Fund   Jan-84-Dec-98    1.50%  4.12% 
 Value-Weighted Fund   Jan-84-Dec-98    1.50%  4.11% 
  Standard & Poor's 500 Index   Jan 84-Dec-98    1.48%  4.33% 
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1 The figures exclude equities held in variable annuities, which would add about $475 billion to the total as of year-
end 1998. 
2 Legislation permitting the pass through treatment of long-term capital gains through a mutual fund was enacted in 
1942. The legislative history provides no indication as to why short-term gains also were not provided with this pass 
through treatment. This omission appears to have been more of an oversight than a conscious effort to treat short-
term gains differently for mutual funds. 
3 Although short-term gains are combined with ordinary dividends for tax purposes, short-term gains do not qualify 
for the dividends-received deduction available to corporate investors. 
4 This argument assumes that capital gain tax rates remain constant. If capital gains taxes were to increase 
significantly, this relationship could reverse because losses could be used to offset a higher potential future tax 
liability.  
5 This paper will use the terms “separate account” or “individually managed account” interchangeably to refer to a 
portfolio of securities managed for one investor. These accounts are not subject to the tax rules of Subchapter M of 
the Internal Revenue Code and are exempt from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
6 Although mutual funds cannot explicitly use the “average cost” basis methods that are available to mutual fund 
shareholders in determining realized gain or loss, a fund could mimic average cost accounting by identifying upon 
sale those tax lots closest to the security’s average cost. 
7 Our discussion and simulations consider a separate account to have an initial investment but no ongoing cash flow 
(except dividends from the underlying investments). This is, of course, quite stylized because separate accounts will   43 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
generally have some cash flow—positive or negative—over the investment horizon. However, we do not consider 
these situations because it does not represent an externality as in the mutual fund context. 
8 Although mutual funds cannot explicitly use the “average cost” basis methods that are available to mutual fund 
shareholders in determining realized gain or loss, a fund could mimic average cost accounting by identifying upon 
sale those tax lots closest to the security’s average cost. 
9 Our discussion and simulations consider a separate account to have an initial investment but no ongoing cash flow 
(except dividends from the underlying investments). This is, of course, quite stylized because separate accounts will 
generally have some cash flow—positive or negative—over the investment horizon. However, we do not consider 
these situations because it does not represent an externality as in the mutual fund context. 
10 Technically, a mutual fund that owned just one security would fail certain diversification tests that must be met in 
order to qualify as a mutual fund. The example given is obviously for illustration only. 
11 The distribution of the realized gains (to the extent they are not reinvested in additional fund shares) would also be 
a negative cash flow event that could force further realizations. This is described in more detail in Dickson (1994) 
and Warther (1996). 
12 Any deferred tax liability could be eliminated to the extent such shares pass through an estate (i.e., stepped-up 
basis) or used for certain charitable contributions. 
13 As mentioned in footnote 6, mutual fund shareholders—but not mutual funds themselves—are allowed to use  
“average cost basis” methods, which are not forms of specific identification. For both mutual funds and their 
shareholders, FIFO is the default method for determining gain or loss. 
14 Tax-efficient accounting is more general than HIFO accounting. For example, it might be preferable to realize a 
larger dollar amount of long-term gains than a smaller amount of short-term gains because of their differences in 
marginal tax rates. Also, a fund with capital loss carry-forwards that will soon expire might want to switch 
accounting techniques to realize a lot of gain. 
15 We used the CRSP data set to determine the identity of these fifty companies and to track their monthly returns 
and distributions from 1984 through 1998.  If a company was merged into another company, we followed the stock 
of the acquirer.  If a company was bought out for cash, we replaced it with the largest market capitalization company 
(in December 1983) that was not already in the data set.   44 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 The expense ratio and reinvestment percentage assumptions are made to approximately real-life portfolios. 
However, the results reported in this section are not sensitive to these assumptions. 
17 We computed as well the returns with actual tax-rates over the period between 1984 and 1998 for high- and 
medium-income individuals. We did not summarize the results with actual tax rates because they are very similar to 
the results reported in this section.  
18 We computed as well the returns with actual tax-rates over the period between 1984 and 1998 for high- and 
medium-income individuals. We did not summarize the results with actual tax rates because they are very similar to 
the results reported in this section.  
19 We present the results for LIFO in just the first simulations. Generally, the results are similar—but slightly less 
tax efficient—to the HIFO case in the generally rising equity market over the simulation period. Also, LIFO is not a 
widely used method among mutual funds because of the significant wash-sale restrictions that are encountered in a 
daily cash flow environment.  
20 This corresponds to an annual turnover rate of approximately 80%. 
21 It should be noted, however, that our “index” funds have even less turnover than most index funds tied to a 
particular market benchmark (e.g., S&P 500). As shown in the data appendix, there was very little change to the 
portfolio’s underlying holdings over the time period examined. As the rate of change in an index fund’s constituents 
changes, accounting techniques would become more important. 
22 As in the simulations of index funds with fluctuating net cash flow, we report the average results of 100 
simulations. 
23 In the “selling winners” scenario, the portfolio manager sells the two positions with the highest ratios of market 
value to cost basis. Similarly, the “selling losers” case looks at selling the two positions with the lowest ratios of 
market value to cost basis (which may or may not result in realized losses). 
24 As discussed above in the description of these simulations, the security selection process (i.e., selling “winners”, 
selling “losers”, or random sales) results in different portfolios because the securities sold from the portfolio differ 
under the three scenarios. Unlike the simulations of index funds where all of the portfolios hold the same stocks in 
the same weights, our actively managed funds simulated here will have different pre-tax returns. 
25 One suggestion that is often made is to split a fund into two without closing it. However, that approach does not 
work if the fund faces liquidity constraints. While smaller funds have greater liquidity, one must consider liquidity   45 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
issues across all funds that a manager advises. As such, a fund that is split still represents one large pool of assets 
managed by the adviser and does not enhance liquidity. 
26 This is a very extreme and somewhat unrealistic form of a fund closing. Usually, a fund is closed to new investors 
and remains open for existing investors (sometimes with annual purchase limits). The example shown, though, is 
consistent with the goal of closing the fund; namely, to ensure that positive cash flow is significantly reduced or 
reversed, so that it does not alter the fund’s investment approach or flexibility. 